Nowhere Home: The Waiting of Vulnerable Child Refugees by Lysaker, Odin
CHAPTER 5




In her 2012 documentary Nowhere Home, filmmaker Margreth Olin sheds
light on the vulnerabilities of child migrants subjected to prolonged wait-
ing. The documentary shows unaccompanied minors being offered only
temporary residence. Echoing the UNHCR’s vocabulary, Olin illustrates
why these irregular migrants can be characterized as ‘particularly vulner-
able’. However, the nature of vulnerability is contested. In the following,
I therefore ask what is an adequate understanding of the concept of vul-
nerability.
Due to child refugees’ particular vulnerability, prolonged waiting can
violate their bodily health and life quality, as well as their inherent dignity
and human rights. Within the context of moral philosophy, I introduce
what I term a waiting guarantee. This principle sets an ethical threshold
level regarding the violation of child refugees’ vulnerability. Furthermore,
it stresses the impacts of child refugees’ prolonged waiting. Consequently,
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the principle states that it is morally unacceptable if prolonged waiting
puts child refugees’ childhood on hold. Illustrated through minors’ life
histories in Olin’s documentary, I claim that we should approach the issue
of child refugees’ long-term waiting through the lens of the waiting guar-
antee. Thus, vulnerability is accounted as something enabling.
I begin by defining the concept of vulnerability as grounded in
humans’ existential precondition against the horizon of Martha A. Fine-
man and other feminist outlooks. Then, inspired by Hannah Arendt, I
shed light on the implications of falling out of time concerning time as a
normative resource and a scarce good. To conclude, drawing on Martha
C. Nussbaum, I present the waiting guarantee.
Vulnerability as a Human Condition
In Nowhere Home, Olin mirrors the UNHCR, since the child migrants
depicted in her documentary can be described as particularly vulnera-
ble. Vulnerability is a key concept within migration discourse (Crock
and Bhabha 2007, p. 22; Bhabha 2016, p. 22; Silas 2018, p. 178;
Kulu-Glasgow et al. 2019). Nonetheless, this concept is disputed. I sug-
gest that we perceive vulnerability as an embodied human condition.
Child Refugees—The ‘Most Vulnerable’
The UNHCR ascribes vulnerability to different groups, such as refugees,
stateless people and asylum seekers, who are viewed as the ‘most vulnerable
groups […] in the world’ (UNHCR 2016, my italics). However, ‘within
this group, there are people who are even more vulnerable’; for instance,
children, the elderly, disabled and ill people (UNHCR 2016, my italics).
Legally, in accordance with the UN 1989 Child Convention, all humans
under 18 years old are recognized as children. The UNHCR claims that
child refugees in terms of unaccompanied children are ‘particularly vul-
nerable’ (UNHCR 1998, my italics), based on the fact that unaccompa-
nied minors are often separated from their parents, guardians, or care-
givers (UNHCR 1999). The younger these children are (i.e. 6–9 years
of age), the more vulnerable they become if they suffer from traumatic
experiences (Sourander 1998).
The UN 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol also count
refugees as some of ‘the most vulnerable people in the world’ (UNHCR
1951, my italics). This is due to refugees’ ‘well-founded fear of being
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persecuted’ by their own country. Such vulnerability exposes them to
mis-recognition of their identities based on, inter alia, race, religion
and nationality, as well as political and social membership. This violates
refugees’ human dignity, since the UN 1951 Refugee Convention is
grounded in the UN 1948 Universal Human Rights Declaration, chiefly
Article 14, which is based on the moral idea of the ‘recognition of the
inherent dignity’ stated in both the Preamble and Article 1. Humans’
dignity is the moral heart of human rights (Habermas 2010). Therefore,
refugees’ vulnerability in general, and child refugees’ special vulnerabil-
ity in particular, should be morally protected through recognizing their
dignity.
Refugee Patients
‘I had enough of this life’, Husein tells Olin. He and his brother Hassan,
both minors that have fled Afghanistan, have struggled for years to make
the Norwegian government recognize Husein’s very poor health situa-
tion. In fact, Husein can be described as a refugee patient, since he feels
like he ‘[j]ust [has] to wait all the time, and never gain control of [his]
life because of what [he has] experienced’.
Within the migration discourse, the term ‘refugee patient’ comprises at
least three aspects (Varvin 2008). First, refugee patients’ human dignity
and human rights are violated due to, for instance, torture and sexual
abuse (Sourander 1998).
Second, refugee patients experience various forms of loss, such as loss
of parents or other caregivers; loss of a place of belonging; or loss of men-
tal and physical capabilities due to, for example, traumatization and post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Refugee patients are sometimes already
suffering from pre-migration traumatic experiences (e.g. forced to hide,
beatings, torture, imprisonment and lack of water or food). Moreover,
traumas can appear during the flight (e.g. loss of hope and prospects of
a good life, uncertainty and mental pain). Moreover, refugee patients can
suffer from stressors in the sense of post-migration traumas (e.g. ongo-
ing temporary protection, anxiety, fear of being repatriated, poor access
to health care, delays in processing applications, loneliness, boredom,
depression, isolation and suicide, as well as worries about their family at
home, disqualification from work, financial difficulties, loss of identity,
competence and social roles) (Carswell et al. 2009; Miller and Rasmussen
2010; Li et al. 2016). Such post-migration problems can be related to
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‘adverse childhood experience’. Children may experience negative events
during their upbringing, which are traumatizing due to the children being
exposed to severe events both inside and outside the family (e.g. loss of
caregivers in early childhood, or being physically, sexually, emotionally,
or verbally abused by caregivers) (Cassidy and Mohr 2001). Addition-
ally, by affecting the mental health and life quality of particularly vulnera-
ble child refugees, adverse childhood experiences can influence, and even
affect, their lifespan (Anda et al. 2006). The latter is important in light
of the consequences regarding child refugees having their childhood put
on hold. These kinds of experiences of traumas before, during and/or
after the flight reduce the child refugees’ functioning and coping with
their own vulnerability (Jensen et al. 2015). Even so, such trauma may
cause problems regarding the child refugees’ later capacity for develop-
ment throughout their life course. Thus, recognition as love, respect and
esteem, as well as persons’ basic need for positive self-development con-
cerning self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem, are at stake (Hon-
neth 1995). As a result, refugee patients often experience both multiple
and prolonged traumatic events. This kind of trauma undermines their
bodily (i.e. mental and physical) health.
Third, refugee patients are characterized by resilience in connection
to being capable of living through, as well as tackling, various kinds of
major stress over a longer time period of prolonged waiting, even though
they are suffering from traumas (Varvin 2008; Fazel et al. 2012). Sta-
ble environments within which the refugee patient can be offered treat-
ment, rehabilitation and development must be created (Varvin 2008).
Consequently, the particularly vulnerable group of minor refugee patients
should be recognized so as to develop the capacity to reflect on and relate
to their own experiences, emotions and thoughts. Resilience also con-
cerns re-establishing and cultivating close and stable relationships based
on basic mutual recognition, such as love and care (ibid.; Honneth 1995).
Here, positive effects can be achieved concerning their bodily health if
they receive a permanent residence permit (Silove et al. 2007). However,
many refugees are subjected to long-term waiting for the result of the
government’s process, which may take months, years, or sometimes even
decades (Jakobsen et al. 2017, p. 2; Parekh 2017).
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Vulnerability as an Existential Precondition
It is worth conceiving the concept of ‘particularly vulnerable’ child
refugees in light of the philosophical discourse about vulnerability.
Roughly, vulnerability can be accounted for in two ways (Mackenzie et al.
2014, pp. 4–7; Mackenzie 2017, p. 85). First, vulnerability is considered
as ‘the contingent and relational susceptibility of particular persons or
groups to threats to their interests’. Second, vulnerability refers to ‘the
universal capacity to suffer’, which is ‘inherent to human embodiment’
(Mackenzie 2017, p. 85; see Fineman 2008, p. 9; Mackenzie et al. 2014,
pp. 1–2, 4, 7; Ferrarese 2017, p. 77).
Surely, between these two outlooks, it can be argued that the former
is the more relevant to child refugees, since this ‘interest-based vulnera-
bility’ is sensitive to contingent contexts within which some members of
this group have a ‘diminished capacity to safeguard their interests relative
to others’ while being subjected to, inter alia, prolonged waiting. The
group of particularly vulnerable child refugees is ‘especially susceptible to
wrongful harms’, which are due to various inequalities (e.g. resources and
power) (Mackenzie 2017, p. 85).
However, morally speaking, I adopt the latter ‘suffering-based vulner-
ability’, which more adequately captures the situation of child refugees
potentially becoming refugee patients. Here, traumatization, for exam-
ple, requires focusing more on bodily experiences, including the subjec-
tive suffering of child refugees exposed to prolonged waiting. Equally,
to highlight the life histories in Olin’s documentary, the ‘suffering-based
vulnerability’ is more relevant, since these minor migrants biographically
reveal experiencing bodily harms (e.g. traumatization).
Such vulnerability is ontological; namely, grounded in certain existen-
tial preconditions (Nussbaum 2006, p. 160; Fineman 2008, pp. 1–2, fn.
25 at 9, 12; 2010, p. 28; Lysaker 2013; Mackenzie 2014, pp. 33, 34, 36,
38; Mackenzie et al. 2014, pp. 1–2, 4, 7; Ferrarese 2018, pp. 27–29).
Thus, vulnerability is situated in ‘a universal, inevitable, enduring aspect
of the human condition’ (Fineman 2008, pp. 1, 8; see 1, 12; Mackenzie
et al. 2014, pp. 4, 5, 8). Put differently, vulnerability is a ‘[g]eneral
shared feature[…] of human life’ (Nussbaum 2013, p. 401, my italics;
see Nussbaum 2006, pp. 43, 87–88, 160, 221, 237, 278). Subsequently,
it is something non-optional and thus irremovable (Lysaker 2013), which
means that, as bodily beings, humans ‘cannot nor would […] want to
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fully eradicate our vulnerability to others’ (Petherbridge 2016, p. 598,
my italics).
Humans’ vulnerability is also related to ‘two forms of individual differ-
ences’. First, vulnerability is linked to ‘physical’ variations (e.g. mental,
emotional, sensual, intellectual and other contrasts in human embodi-
ment). Such variations can be further linked to the fact that ‘[all] [h]uman
beings are in general disabled’ (Nussbaum 2004, p. 306, my italics). This
implies different ways in which each human being is ‘mortal, weak-eyed,
weak-kneed, with terrible backs and necks, short memories and so forth’
(ibid.). Such ‘general disability’ can be viewed in light of what I term
humans’ ‘existential life graph’ (Lysaker 2015; see Mackenzie et al. 2014,
p. 1; Ferrarese 2018, p. 33). Our lives always already fluctuate, by which I
mean that throughout one’s life course humans’ shared vulnerability can
occur to a lesser or greater extent, as well as for a shorter or longer period
of time (Nussbaum 2006, p. 101).
Second, our vulnerability is connected to ‘social’ variations (e.g. con-
structed on the basis that individuals are institutionally situated within
the context of complex and overlapping webs of relationships) (Fineman
2013, p. 21). Then, vulnerability is contingent on the social environment
within which the person exists, such as birth, upbringing, development,
adulthood and illness (Nussbaum 2006, pp. 87, 111, 120, 125, 129, 132,
143, 160, 221). However, contextually, vulnerability also signifies some-
thing non-contingent, such as ageing, health reduction, protracted ill-
ness, old age and one’s own death (ibid., pp. 111, 120, 123, 125, 143).
In turn, this ‘requires forms of social action and cooperation’ through
recognition as love, respect and esteem (Honneth 1995; Anderson and
Honneth 2005; Petherbridge 2016, p. 598) to have this social dimension
surrounding one’s vulnerability safeguarded.
Vulnerability is further grounded in basic needs (e.g. food, water,
health, sanitation, shelter, clothing and education) (Fineman 2008, p. 10;
Mackenzie et al. 2014, p. 1; Ferrarese 2017, p. 77). These bodily needs
are extended through all periods of a person’s life course. To exist at all, as
well as to develop our life in accordance with our capabilities, these needs
must be met. If not, due to our vulnerability, we may be exposed to vari-
ous forms of suffering; for example, physical illness, injury and mortality
(Mackenzie et al. 2014, p. 1). Thus, in light of vulnerability creating basic
needs, we should, as needy and suffering creatures, be provided with capa-
bilities for developing an undistorted and positive self-relation (Honneth
1995; Petherbridge 2016, p. 598; Schweiger and Graf 2017, p. 245).
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Our bodily vulnerability, as based on humans’ fundamental needs, cre-
ates ‘a [basic] form of interdependence that attends to the subject in
her [bodily] needfulness’ (Petherbridge 2016, p. 598; see Fineman 2010,
pp. 21–22; Mackenzie et al. 2014, p. 1). This dependency is ‘unavoidable
and inevitable’, as well as ‘developmental and biological’ (ibid., p. 23).
Irrespective of age, it makes us needy vis-à-vis others (Honneth 1995;
Mackenzie et al. 2014, pp. 1, 4; Ferrarese 2017, p. 77). Still, such depen-
dency is ‘episodic and as shifting in degree over the lifetime of an individ-
ual’ (Fineman 2008, p. 12; 2010, p. 25).
Vulnerability is also connected to human affections. We are emotionally
and psychologically vulnerable to others (e.g. loss, mourning and grief)
(Mackenzie et al. 2014, pp. 1, 7). Building on this, humans’ fundamental
‘openness’ vis-à-vis the ‘richness of sensuality and sensual encounters with
[oneself] the other and with the world’ (Petherbridge 2016, p. 598).
It is significant, therefore, to disconnect vulnerability from such neg-
ative associations as helplessness and passivity (Mackenzie 2014, p. 33;
Fineman 2008, p. 8). Rather, we should recognize that vulnerability con-
tains a productive potentiality; namely, that ‘vulnerability can have positive
manifestations and value, enabling the development of empathy, compas-
sion, and community’ (Gilson 2013, p. 8, my italics; see Fineman 2008,
p. 11; Petherbridge 2016, p. 598; Ferrarese 2018, p. 30). In turn, our
vulnerability enables humans to act and interact (Ferrarese 2018, p. 30) in
terms of ‘affective activity’ (Ferrarese 2018, p. 38). This is related to ‘re-
lational autonomy’ (Mackenzie 2014, p. 33; Ferrarese 2018, p. 30). Such
an approach to autonomy is ‘premised on recognition of human vulner-
ability’ (Mackenzie et al. 2014, p. 16). Here, the so-called ‘autonomy
myth’—namely, the imaginary that humans are self-sufficient, indepen-
dent, and rational (Fineman 2008; Mackenzie 2014, p. 33)—is criticized.
In view of suffering-based vulnerability, then, the UNHCR’s as well as
Olin’s description of child refugees as particularly vulnerable relates to a
basic, inherent and bodily vulnerability, shared universally and expressed
uniquely by all humans.
Vulnerable to Moral Injury
Ethically, child refugees’ particular vulnerability can be conceptualized in
view of being ‘vulnerable to moral injury’ (Honneth 1995, p 48; see
Butler 2004, p. 20). Specifically, it is an affinity between one’s subjec-
tive experience of embodied vulnerability, on the one hand, and human
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dignity, on the other. When individuals mutually perceive each other as
‘morally vulnerable persons’, they recognize each other concerning their
‘fundamental claims to [bodily] integrity’ (Honneth 1995, p. 48). Con-
sequently, ‘the specific vulnerability of humans result[s] from the inter-
nal interdependence [grounded in] […] recognition’ (ibid., p. 131, my
italics). Thus, each person shares a basic need for recognition, which is
due to our specific embodied vulnerability that can be exposed to ‘injury’
through others’ mis-recognition (ibid.; see Butler 2004, p. 20; 2010,
p. 2). If so, to have one’s bodily vulnerability injured can ‘bring the iden-
tity of the person as a whole to the point of collapse’ (ibid., p. 132, my
italics; see pp. 133, 135).
In the case of child refugees, being vulnerable to moral injury indicates
having one’s particular vulnerability mis-recognized in the shape of vio-
lations of the person’s bodily integrity and human dignity. Accordingly,
child refugees’ development through a wide range of processes consist-
ing of socialization, internalization and individuation ideally leads to an
undistorted and positive self-realization: ‘Without the assumption of a
certain measure of self-confidence, of legally enshrined autonomy and of
a belief in one’s ability, it is impossible to imagine a successful process
of self-realization’ (Honneth 2001, p. 50, my italics). Such mutual rela-
tionships of recognition as love, respect and esteem are necessary com-
ponents, therefore, if children, hereunder child refugees, are to achieve
a successful self-realization. If not, they would suffer from misdevelop-
ment: ‘[I]n order to be able to acquire an undistorted relation-to-self,
human subjects always need—over and above the experience of affection-
ate care and legal recognition—a form of social esteem that allows them
to relate positively to their concrete traits and abilities’ (Honneth 1995,
p. 121, my italics). Here, humans’ basic undistorted self-relations include
self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem. These dimensions represent
ways to safeguard that humans, including child refugees, to the greatest
extent possible, are capable of relating to themselves, to others, as well as
to the wider world in an undistorted, positive and successful manner.
It is thus important to avoid ‘autonomy gaps’ (Anderson 2017);
namely, the discrepancy between a cultural expectation that people, on
a societal and institutional level, become autonomous, on the one hand,
and what I above term as humans’ ‘existential life graph’, on the other.
Autonomy gaps are thus undermined, by, for instance, harming individ-
uals with respect to their actual capabilities for societal participation on
a par with each other. Moreover, such autonomy gaps cause emotional
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harm because of the bodily stress people experience due to powerless-
ness, while not being able to continue with the expectations of being
autonomous.
Therefore, since human dignity is ontologically grounded in our bodily
vulnerability, autonomy gaps can even degrade human dignity. In turn,
it is important to supplement our story about humans as autonomous
by showing the ways in which we are vulnerable and dependent. To the
extent to which child refugees are often more vulnerable than others, they
are also more exposed to these autonomy gaps and ways in which could
result in mis-recognition of their dignity.
However, through recognition children develop skills to tackle their
embodied vulnerability and injurability on the basis of ‘agentic resources’
(Anderson 2017). Through such developmental capacities and processes,
children undergo a transition from being totally dependent on others (e.g.
their parents) to learning how to become increasingly mature and inde-
pendent. Hence, children and their childhoods are ‘never on hold’, since
‘developmental needs do not wait for an emergency phase of a refugee
situation to end’ (Sourander 1998, my italics; see Graf and Schweiger
2017; Schweiger and Graf 2017). Still, traumas before, during and/or
after they flee can ‘harm children’s physical, intellectual, psychological,
cultural and social development’ (Sourander 1998), which is due to dis-
ruption, uprooting and insecurity of forced displacement and prolonged
waiting. Against this horizon, vulnerability is ‘inherent’ by being ontolog-
ically conditioned through embodied developmental capabilities, as well
as ‘situational’ by being practised as well as hindered within concrete life
forms (Mackenzie 2017, p. 89).
In light of the significant role of recognition concerning child
refugees’ particular vulnerability, mis-recognition can incorporate struc-
tural ‘patterns of humiliation and denigration’ (Anderson and Honneth
2005, pp. 135–136). Subsequently, this makes children ‘less able to
be self-determining’ concerning the care for undistorted and negative
self-realization related to their agentic resources in a developmental life
stage that are crucial for every child (ibid., pp. 135–136; Anderson 2017;
Schweiger and Graf 2017, p. 247).
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Falling Out of Time
‘Are you lonely?’, Olin asks Goli, a Kurdish migrant minor, who was
recently deported from Norway. ‘Yes’, he answers. Then Goli adds:
‘Sometimes I don’t give a fuck, but not always.’ In Olin’s documentary,
Goli’s everyday life can be described as falling out of time, since he is sent
back and forth between Norway and Greece.
Due to protracted refugee situations and other forms of prolonged
waiting, particularly vulnerable child refugees and other migration minors
are mis-recognized if they fall out of time. This means an exclusion from
a normal, expectable lifecycle in terms of socially shared scripts of life
pathways and life courses, including expectations about the timing and
sequencing of role transitions (Settersten and Hagestad 1996; Hagestad
and Dykstra 2016). Subsequently, refugee minors’ life course is put on
hold regarding temporally conditioned everyday life practices of child-
hood (e.g. eating, being cared for, playing, or attending school). Further-
more, falling out of time implies that normal expectancies about a healthy
body, predictable linear time and expected durations are no longer con-
formed to the normal timetable scripts (Hagestad 1996).
Protracted Refugee Situations
‘Nobody wants to do die, but I risk it. I have waited too long’, Goli
answers in response to Olin expressing her worry when he is about to
travel in a boat bringing irregular migrants to Europe. Olin continues by
saying that ‘[t]here’s a possibility of it’s not going to be […] a suicide
trip’.
By introducing the concept of protracted refugee situations, the
UNHCR seeks durable solutions to the current global challenge of forced
displacement, such as in Goli’s case. The term is defined as a situation in
which refugees, including children, find themselves in a ‘long-lasting and
intractable state of limbo’ (UNHCR 2004, my italics). Moreover, the
term is defined as situations lasting at least 5 years, with no prospects of
durable solutions. However, according to the UNHCR’s figures, glob-
ally many protracted refugees experience this situation far longer than
5 years, and it can last an estimated 26 years on average (UNHCR
2015). Additionally, according to the UNHCR (2009), 23 of the 32
protracted refugee situations have lasted for more than 20 years. Even
so, in some cases protracted refugee situations continue for generations.
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Subsequently, many children are born and raised, and in some cases even
become adults and elderly, while waiting for a durable solution regarding
their uncertain future.
These refugees’ lives ‘may not be at risk, but their basic, rights [e.g.
human rights and human dignity] and essential economic, social and psy-
chological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile’ (UNHCR 2004,
my italics). Additionally, refugees in this limbo situation are ‘often unable
to break free from enforced reliance on external assistance’ (ibid., my ital-
ics), which continues to harm their bodily vulnerability.
As particularly vulnerable, children experiencing protracted refugee sit-
uations fall out of time by being mis-recognized through lacking love,
respect and esteem, as well as self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem.
Accordingly, while living in a limbo situation, it is highly challenging to
restore normalcy, stability, predictability and resilience, and hence avoid
becoming, inter alia, refugee patients.
Time as a Normative Resource
Time, as well as falling out of time, is an existential matter if one’s child-
hood is put on hold in terms of being excluded from a normal, stable
and predictable lifecycle. To avoid this fate thus involves being recognized
regarding everyday life routines (e.g. caring, eating, playing).
What Arendt (1958, p. 8) conceptualizes as the human condition of
natality—namely, temporality in terms of, for example, birth, life-course,
action—considers time as existential; namely, a given and non-optional
condition of human existence. Given that every human is ontologically
a temporal being (Horst and Lysaker 2020). Although Arendt connects
time to the human condition of mortality, being temporal also denotes
unexpected and unpredicted action and interaction. Hence, temporality
not only produces an inherent existential vulnerability of fragility or even
mortality, but also generates what Arendt describes as the hopes and mir-
acles of ‘new beginnings’ (Arendt 1958, pp. 9, 246–247) in capacity of
thinking, judging and acting within spaces of appearance (ibid., pp. 5, 7,
198–199). Thus, prior to the human condition of plurality, meaning the
diversity of unique identities, we must recognize each human’s temporally
preconditioned existence. This is partly what is at stake if someone, such
as particularly vulnerable child refugees, falls out of time.
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Time as a Scarce Good
Humans as temporal beings infers that time is a scarce good, too. This
is due to the ontological fact that we have more or less of it, and some-
times we have very little, almost no, time. Moreover, since our tempo-
rally preconditioned life course can be over any minute, this turns humans
into a particularly vulnerable creature. Therefore, to have one’s years with
human dignity and life quality reduced—for instance, due to prolonged
waiting—is both psychologically and relationally harmful.
Today, according to the UN’s World Population Prospects 2015 Revi-
sion, the global average life expectancy at birth is around 71.5 years across
gender. Nonetheless, humans’ existential life graph and time as a scarce
good demonstrate that not every individual has the opportunity to con-
duct their life in accordance with this average; that is, in line with time as
a normative resource. Rather, a long, healthy life with quality and dignity
can suddenly—such as when Goli risks his life to return to Norway while
experiencing prolonged waiting—be undermined and eventually over.
This existential account of time resonates with Nussbaum’s concept of
human capabilities, which refers to ‘what people are actually able to do
and to be’ (Nussbaum 2006, p. 70). The first, and most basic, capability is
‘life’ itself: ‘Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length
[i.e. average life expectancy]; not dying prematurely, or before one’s life
is so reduced as to be not worth living’ (Nussbaum 2006, p. 76, my
italics). Furthermore, Nussbaum talks about ‘functioning’: ‘[capabilities]
[…] use[…] the idea of a threshold level of each capability’ (ibid., p. 71,
original italics), ‘beneath which it is held that truly human functioning is
not available’ (ibid., my italics). Accordingly, to live one’s life in harmony
with capabilities and functionally, each human being should be able to
live to the end of a human life of average expectancy.
Waiting Guarantee
To find ways in which to avoid prolonged waiting in the case of Husein,
Goli and other particularly vulnerable child refugees, we need to explore
how ethically to limit such long-term limbo situations, too.
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Ethics of the Temporary
In light of an ethics of the temporary, which I relate to my own moral
principle of a waiting guarantee, the problem of prolonged waiting is
described as follows: ‘far from being temporary, [forced] displacement
[e.g. child refugees] ought to be rigorous ethical consideration’. Thus, we
have to take a closer look at the ‘the moral dimension of how [forced]
displaced are treated between the time of their exile and when [if ever]
they are finally able to find a permanent durable solution’ (Parekh 2017,
p. 3, my italics).
Along these lines, there are at least two reasons why the global situ-
ation of prolonged waiting should be criticized. First, empirically, ‘[t]his
period of time [e.g. prolonged waiting time or protracted refugee situa-
tion] is ever growing, and more and more people spend their lives’ in such
a situation (Parekh 2017, p. 3, my italics). The UNHCR (2015) doc-
uments that the global number of forced displaced people had reached
65.3 million. Here, more than 50%—that is, over 32 million—are chil-
dren. Simultaneously, forced displaced minors are particularly vulnerable.
Consequently, forced displacement is viewed by the UNHCR as one of
the major humanitarian and developmental problems facing the world
today. Relatedly, the UNHCR defines around 12 million out of the total
of 65 million (i.e. nearly 20%) as existing in protracted refugee situations.
Second, normatively, ‘[f]or the vast majority of people, […] a [pro-
longed waiting] time [is] characterized by confinement and human rights
violations ’ (Parekh 2017, p. 3, my italics). Accordingly, to the extent
which human rights’ moral core is the recognition of persons’ inherent
dignity (Habermas 2010), these human rights violations simultaneously
disrespect their dignity. Against this backdrop, related to, for instance,
refugee patients, it can be further claimed that prolonged waiting ‘should
[morally] not be the accepted norm’. Instead, child refugees and oth-
ers subjected to forced displacement ought to be morally treated ‘as fully
human and with [morally] dignity’ (ibid., my italics).
An adequate way in which to avoid child refugees’ prolonged wait-
ing, then, entails ‘a morally acceptable way to house refugees [e.g. child
refugees] and allow them to live with [inherent moral] dignity [even]
while they are waiting to be resettled or to return to their home coun-
tries’ (ibid., p. 137, my italics). Consequently, existing in a particular vul-
nerable life situation, which is exactly what child migrants such as Husein
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and Goli do, this should be taken into closer consideration. If so, accept-
ing the mis-recognition of this groups’ particular embodied vulnerability
equals morally ignoring these refugees’ very human condition as temporal
beings, on the basis of which they belong to humanity and thus should
have their dignity recognized.
Embodied Human Dignity
Dignity seems to be the overarching theme of Nowhere Home. During
the documentary, Olin states that ‘every human being must be a goal in
itself’. However, Goli and other child migrants have their dignity mis-
recognized and apparently have no hope of regaining it.
To support Olin’s claim, we thus have to address the concept of human
dignity in a relevant manner, since this is the moral threshold level above
which this group of refugees should live, even if—or, exactly when—they
are exposed to prolonged waiting. Here, in line with Nussbaum’s picture
of human capabilities, inherent dignity can be approached from exactly
the perspective of a moral threshold. What Nussbaum describes as ‘life’
itself, and the way in which it resonates with the Arendtian term ‘natality’,
serves as an existential precondition for all the other capabilities: without
existence in terms of human life in the first place, we cannot develop
ourselves along the lines of the other capabilities (bodily health, senses,
imagination, thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation and so on).
Furthermore, this threshold identifies the fundamental requirements
for living ‘a life worthy of human dignity’ (Nussbaum 2006, p. 70), which
implies a ‘fully human living’ (ibid., p. 279) throughout a person’s entire
lifespan. To exist beneath this level, then, suggests that humans’ embod-
ied dignity is mis-recognized concerning the basic need for recognition
in terms of love, respect and esteem, as well as positive self-development
regarding self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem (Honneth 1995).
One way in which my ethics of waiting can be normatively justified is to
reject all prolonged waiting that exceeds the UNHCR’s limit of 5 years of
protracted refugee situations. Moreover, in accordance with the Arendtian
idea of time as a human condition, as well as a normative resource and a
scarce good, it can be argued that, as soon as the capability to live one’s
lifespan in accordance with one’s inherent dignity and human rights, as
well as bodily health and life quality (Turner 2006, p. 25) is undermined
due to prolonged waiting, this situation is morally unacceptable.
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In Nussbaum, dignity is related precisely to both humans’ temporal-
ity and embodiment. Temporally, since our capabilities are grounded in
the very basic one, ‘life’ itself, it follows that the other capabilities should
existentially and morally protect the ability to live to the end of a normal
human lifespan. Moreover, to the extent to which this basic capability of
life itself serves as the moral basis on which one should be able to live a
life worthy of human dignity, the other capabilities should be achieved for
‘each and every person, treating each as an end and none as a mere tool
of the ends of others’. Hence, to have one’s life course put on hold—as
in the case of particularly vulnerable child refugees’ prolonged waiting—is
a way in which to have one’s ontologically grounded and bodily appear-
ing capability of life, and thus one’s inherent dignity, mis-recognized. To
Nussbaum, therefore, the very basic capability of life itself establishes ‘a
bare minimum of what respect for human dignity requires’ (Nussbaum
2006, p. 70, my italics; see pp. 74, 180, 274, 278). In short, it expresses
the moral grounding of humans’ temporal life worthy of dignity.
Regarding embodiment, Nussbaum holds that the inherent moral
worth of each person is primarily grounded in given and shared bod-
ily ways in which humans exist and thus should be protected by others.
Accordingly, dignity is something that ‘inheres in the animal body’ (Nuss-
baum 2006, p. 87) and ‘bodily need[s]’, including the need for recogni-
tion as care (ibid., p. 160). This central role of the body is also visible with
regard to several other capabilities that safeguard ‘truly human’ life, such
as ‘bodily health’ and ‘bodily integrity’ (ibid., p. 76). Here, the human
body enables the realization of these capabilities through such capacities
as the sense apparatus, the nervous system and our emotional life.
Nussbaum also argues that humans’ inner worth ‘could not be posed
by a being who was not mortal and vulnerable’ (Nussbaum 2006, p. 132,
my italics; see pp. 87–88). Against this background, she argues that ‘bodily
need, including the need for care, is a feature of both of our rationality
and our sociability’ (ibid., p. 160, my italics). To care for others not only
presupposes our own emotional and sensual empathy, but also that others
are receptive addressees regarding such recognitive caregiving.
This idea of dignity is explicitly related to children, which can be linked
to the issue of child refugees. To live a dignified life indicates to Nussbaum
that others should treat each person through ‘[g]ood care’. This denotes
that due to their ‘acute or asymmetrical dependency’ and ‘primary needs’,
to respect children’s dignity requires a special ‘focus[…] on [the] sup-
port for capabilities of life, health, and bodily integrity’ (Nussbaum 2006,
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p. 168). Hence, I not only take humans in general, but also, particu-
larly, vulnerable child refugees as a group that requires special protec-
tion in light of the capabilities. Capability-based needs should, then, be
normatively justified as children’s ‘special priority’. Such a moral priority,
echoing the UNHCR’s account of child refugees as particularly vulnera-
ble, is based on what Nussbaum describes as ‘the special vulnerability of
children’ (Dixon and Nussbaum 2012, p. 549, my italics; see Benporath
2003; Mullin 2014; Macleod 2017; Schweiger and Graf 2017).
Accordingly, she introduces a ‘vulnerability principle’, which holds that
‘an important component to [the capabilities approach] […] [is that] it
recognizes human frailty and vulnerability as central parts of the [Arend-
tian] human condition for adults as well as for children’ (Dixon and Nuss-
baum 2012, p. 584, my italics). So, children’s special vulnerability regard-
ing, for instance, physical, emotional and cognitive maturity through
recognitive and hence positive, undistorted self-development, can be safe-
guarded to a greater extent than is currently the case (ibid., p. 574). If so,
the transnational situation of child refugees—particularly their prolonged
waiting—would most certainly be improved.
Towards a Waiting Guarantee
The ethical guideline I wish to propose can be stated thus: it is morally
unacceptable if prolonged waiting puts child refugees’ childhood on
hold. An important aspect of this waiting guarantee is the way in which
it requires being more aware concerning the difference between ‘mis-
recognition’ and ‘non-recognition’ (Lysaker 2013). Recognition as love,
respect and esteem are basic bodily and relational needs that are ontolog-
ically shared by all humans. However, in cases in which people lack such
recognition, it occurs in at least two ways. With mis-recognition, I mean
when humans in general, and child refugees in particular, are capable of
struggling to regain their recognition after being humiliated. Hence, such
cases are ‘ordinary’ in the sense that the very struggle may take a while
to succeed, but without lasting too long as for the mis-recognized person
to yet again being recognized.
Non-recognition, however, undermines even the person’s very capacity
to struggle for recognition after being mis-recognized in terms of trauma-
tization or dehumanization. For instance, in cases in which child refugees
are exposed to prolonged waiting, as well as traumatization before, under
and/or after the flight, the implication of this can be that the children’s
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prolonged waiting is even further prolonged due to the traumatizations
as non-recognition. Then, these two forms of recognitive negation are
ways in which to identify the moral threshold level in Nussbaum, beneath
which the dignity of child refugees is turned into the situations in which
these children cannot regain their recognized life form due to severe bod-
ily health issues stemming from their prolonged waiting.
To prevent not only what I describe as mis-recognition, but also non-
recognition, it is relevant to relate Nussbaum’s ‘vulnerability principle’ in
the case of children—including child refugees—to the UN 1989 Child
Convention. Here, Article 3 declares the following moral principle: ‘In
all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or leg-
islative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consider-
ation’ (UN 1989, my italics). So, if the best interests of the child shall
be safeguarded, particularly the vulnerable group of child refugees should
not be exposed to prolonged waiting in terms of non-recognition, includ-
ing its costs concerning reduced bodily health and life quality, as well as
violated inherent dignity and human rights.
Conclusion
In Nowhere Home, we are told the life histories of child migrants such
as Husein, Hassan and Goli. Starting from brief examples from the
documentary, I have explored the dynamics between vulnerability, child
refugees and prolonged waiting. I have underscored how various exclu-
sion mechanisms mis-recognize this group of irregular migrants’ inherent
dignity, bodily health, life quality and human rights.
Accordingly, particularly vulnerable child refugees should not have
their childhood put on hold due to prolonged waiting. Instead, the ethi-
cal demand of Olin’s documentary, as I see it, concerns recognizing child
refugees’ basic capabilities to live above the threshold level concerning
the vulnerable and injurable nature of their embodied dignity.
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